"Only One Returned" by MAJ Jimmy W. Kilbourne, USAF, is the story of the loss of Jolly Green 26.
Special thanks to Airman Magazine for allowing me to use this article, which appeared in the March 1969 issue.

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This mission report is from Crown 1 on the loss of Jolly Green 26.
(This document was sent to us by Robert LaPointe, SMSgt, USAF, Retired PJ, 1969-1995)

12-13 November 1967

Capt May

Mission Narrative 1-31182

Crown 1 departed Udorn at 12/2200Z and arrived at the SAR scene at 2240Z. At this time, Sandy 7 and 8 were on scene and in contact with the two ground parties that had been put into the area the previous evening. The ground parties had the call signs Bulldog and Wonderful Time.

Since Crown aircraft have no FM capability, the information was relayed to Crown through Sandy 7 and 8. Bulldog reported that at 2238Z the weather was bad ˆ ceiling zero. At 2320Z, the weather was improving. Only the mountaintops were now obscured. At 2355, Bulldog reported from the wreckage of JG 26. He reported possibly three bodies in the wreckage. The aircraft had been destroyed by fire and identification of the bodies was impossible at the time. Bulldog also reported two possible survivors approaching the scene. These people were later reported acting suspiciously. The report on them was at 0030Z. Since they were acting suspiciously, no attempt was made to approach them. Instead, the ground party attempted to account for everyone in the three helicopter wreckages.

At 0010Z, Bulldog reported four bodies in JG 26 wreckage, and at 0030Z a fifth body was reported. The body count was complete and all onboard JG 26 WERE accounted for with the identification of the fifth body. Bulldog also reported finding „equipment of 10‰ on JG 26.

At 0048Z, Queen reported one enlisted man from the UH-1 was still not accounted for. At 0051Z, Culver City reported all crewmembers on the UH-1 accounted for. Prior to this time, Crown 1 knew of only two accounted for on the UH-1, call sign Typhoon 2. Of four crewmembers, one was reported rescued, one KIA. At 0130Z, Culver City again reported all accounted for on the UH-1.

Sandy 7 reported that all had been rescued on the VNAF H-34, King Bee Lead. At 0140Z, a Covey FAC arrived on the scene to provide FM contact with Bulldog. He reported that Culver City was sending four helicopters to remove bodies. Rescue forces were given RTB and Crown 1 returned to normal orbit.

The crew on Crown 1 for this mission had also been flying Crown 1 on the previous day. On that mission, we monitored the communications of the original rescue effort conducted for JG 26. We concur with the narrative written by the crew of Crown 6. The still unexplained failure to allow JG 04 to rescue an injured American resulted in his death. In addition, the failure over a period of more than four hours to follow the unanimous recommendation of the on-scene commander and of all forces in the SAR area to allow JG 04 to pick up the survivors was at best demoralizing to the rescue forces. The many other USAF and VNAF crew who played some part in this effort undoubtedly had their faith in our rescue capability severely shaken.

This mission report is from Crown 6 on the loss of Jolly Green 26.
(This document was sent to us by Robert LaPointe, SMSgt, USAF, Retired PJ, 1969-1995)

9 November 1967

Capt Purvis

Mission Narrative 1-3-182

Crown 6 was scrambled by Queen. The only information available was that JG 26 was down. Crown was airborne at 2130Z. Queen was contacted on UHF overhead CH 94. They gave the position of the SAR effort as 274/78/CH94 and directed Crown 6 to contact Sandy 7, the on-scene commander, for a briefing on the current situation.

Sandy 7 provided the following information. During the night, three helicopters had been downed by ground fire. They were JG 26, a VNAF H-34, and an Army UH-1. No survivors had been recovered and the total number of people onboard the choppers was uncertain. Numerous beepers in the area made voice contact on guard impossible.

At 2240Z, Sandy 7 located one of the choppers and possibly a survivor near it. A few minutes later he spotted a flare on the ground. At 2322Z, Sandy 7 saw a man in some tall grass. He was wearing a flight suit and using a signal mirror. Sandy 7 requested that JG‚s be launched. The request was passed to Queen. Queen advised Crown 6 that the use of gunships was more desirable and suggested that an attempt be made to contact Hue tower for possible support. All tower frequencies available were tried with no success. This information was passed to Queen.

At 2333Z, Sandy 8 located two survivors in an open area. They were identified as Americans. JG‚s were again requested. At 2345Z, JG 07 was launched from CH 94 and JG 04 was launched from Cigar, Crown 6 dispatched Hobo 21 flight to escort JG 07 and Hobo 25 flight to escort JG 04. At 0006Z, Queen advised that three VNAF H-34‚s and two gunships were enroute. Call signs, ETA, and frequencies for contact were not available. Three minutes later, King diverted JG 07 to CH69. At 0013Z, Sandy 6, who was now on-scene commander, located three more survivors near the downed VNAF helo. JG 04 arrived on scene at 0028Z. Crown 6 was repeatedly unable to obtain clearance for JG 04 to make a pickup. At 0050Z, contact was made with Cyclone Lead, one of the gunships escorting the VNAF H-34‚s. They were on scene at 0058Z. No one, including Cyclone, had radio contact with the VNAF helicopters. Contact was attempted on the SAR frequencies and Guard with no success. At 0106Z, Covey 43, a FAC on-scene, reported two American survivors. These were the two sighted earlier by Sandy 8. Covey 43 reported that he had been flying at very low altitude and had received no ground fire. He requested release for JG 04. At 0106Z, Sandy 6 reported numerous American survivors, some wounded, on the ground and requested release for JG 04. Again, Crown 6 was unable to obtain permission for JG 04 to make the pickup. At this time there were a total of six A-1 aircraft and two armed helicopters overhead for cover. At 0120Z Covey 43 advised that the VNAF helicopters had picked up five survivors, possibly three Vietnamese and two Americans. Due to the lack of communications no determination as to condition could be made. Cyclone Lead tried, by flying alongside the VNAF choppers and pointing to the two Americans in the clear area, to get one of them to make the pickup, but was unable. JG 04 was overhead and requested permission to make the pickup. King advised JG 04 to cross the border immediately and orbit there or face a court-martial when he landed. JG 04 departed. At 0134Z, Cyclone advised that a hoist would be necessary to pick up the two Americans since a landing could not be made. Crown again advised Queen of the situation and requested release for JG 04. At 0159Z, Crown 6 left the SAR scene to refuel JG 04.

At 0210Z, Sandy 6 reported a survivor with a leg wound and requested release of JG 04. This was one of the two Americans in the open previously located by Covey 43. At 0218Z, JG 04 was cleared back into the area, but was instructed to hold high. JG 04 located the two survivors. Sandy 6 reported the area free from ground fire. JG 04 was holding overhead the survivors and requested permission to make the pickup. It was denied.

Cyclone and King Bee (VNAF H-34‚s) returned to the area at 0345Z. Sandy 7 put down screening smoke and King Bee picked up one of the American survivors. They were unable to locate the other, the one reported to have a leg wound, and departed for Phu Bai at 0418Z.

At 0430Z, Crown 6 departed the immediate area to refuel JG 04. Covey 57, the FAC now on-scene, advised Crown 6 at 0515Z that a helicopter force with gunship support was enroute with a ground party. The ETA was 0600Z. The ground party was inserted at 0612Z and moved into the area of the downed aircraft. Crown 6 was unable to secure information concerning the progress of the ground party except through Covey 51 because of the lack of FM equipment on board

The ground party recovered one American KIA at 0746Z. He was not from the crew of JG 26. Cyclone 4 and 5, gunships, reported an American in a flight suit walking uphill at 0843Z. One helicopter jettisoned his ordnance and made the pickup. The survivor was the pilot of JG 26. He was badly burned. He reported that there were two more survivors from JG 26 and that he had not seen them since morning. Cyclone 4 and 5 checked the area but were unable to locate survivors. They departed for Phu Bai at 0854Z.

Covey 51 advised that he had requested more helicopters. He also asked Crown 6 to request constant flare cover and Hobo support for the night. This request was passed on to Queen and Hillsboro. After briefing Crown 5 on the situation, Crown 6 departed for CH83 at 0930Z.

Two communications problems were noted. The lack of communications with the VNAF helicopters during their first mission greatly hampered their usefulness. The absence of FM equipment on Crown aircraft makes communication with Army and Marine forces, both air and ground, difficult at best.

The failure to commit JG 04 caused the death of the American who was seen in the clearing by Covey 43 at 0106Z and reported bleeding badly from a leg wound by Sandy 6 at 0210Z. If there existed some reason for not allowing a pickup when six A-1 aircraft were available for cover in an area where no ground fire had been reported by Sandy or Covey aircraft, it is not immediately obvious.

I have requested from local sources a list of Army and Marine helicopter units in northern South Vietnam, to include call signs and frequencies, if resources other than those of ARRS are going to be required to effect timely rescue operations information of this sort is essential.

This mission report is from Jolly Green 29 on the loss of Jolly Green 26.
(This document was sent to us by Robert LaPointe, SMSgt, USAF, Retired PJ, 1969-1995)

10 November 1967

Subject: Mission Narrative Report (1-3-182, 8 & 9 Nov 67)

TO:37C

3rd ARRG (JSARC)

1. This report is submitted IAW ARRSM 55-2/3, ARRG Sup 1, dtd 15 June 1967.

2. Jolly Greens 29 and 26 were alerted for cockpit alert at 1450Z. At 1505Z both Jollys scrambled. JG 29 and 26 were airborne at 1510Z and climbed for altitude. JG 29 contacted Queen for instructions and was advised to contact Covey 57 on FM frequency 49.3. Covey 57 advised JG 29 to proceed to 262/40/69 for a team extraction. Covey 57 advised JG 29 that the area was extremely hostile and the enemy was using heavy automatic weapons and rifle grenades. He further advised JG 29 that one H-34 and one UH-1 gunship had been shot down in the area attempting the extraction. JG's 29 and 26 continued to climb to 8000 feet and proceeded directly to the target. JG‚s 29 and 26 were on target at 1605Z and Covey advised JG‚s 29 and 26 to hold to the north at altitude while he had the area softened. Blindbat was dropping flares and Cyclone flight, 3 UH-1 gunships, were strafing and rocketing around the team. The team‚s call sign was Flatfoot. They advised JG 29 that there were five people to be picked up. Cyclone Lead advised JG 29 the altitude of the target was 2800 feet. JG 29 decided to attempt to pick up all five while JG 26 stayed high in reserve. Queen advised JG 29 that a flight of two Hobos, 2 A-1E‚s, had been scrambled and should be in the area. Cyclone Lead advised Covey 57 and JG 29 that the gunships were getting low on ammunition and would have to leave soon. JG 29 decided to attempt the pickup using the gunships as cover. When attempts to make radio contact with Hobo flight were unsuccessful, JG 29 dropped tip tanks and dumped fuel down to 2000 lbs, the amount needed to make the pickup and recover at Channel 69. Cyclone lead advised JG 29 to come in low from west to east. JG 29 began the approach at 1430Z. Cyclone Lead vectored JG 29 into the target until Flatfoot‚s strobe light was spotted by JG 29. JG 29 decided to land on the side of the steep slope in front of the team and facing them. The slope was so steep only the nose gear and left main were firmly on the ground, the right main was touching with the strut fully extended. As JG 29 touched down the co-pilot and flight mechanic advised the pilot that the aircraft was being hit by ground fire. JG held on the ground as the five members of Flatfoot Team started toward the aircraft. Despite hand signals and radio calls from JG 29 advising the team to come to the right side of the helicopter, the survivors went to the left side. JG 29 was on the ground 3-5 minutes while the team crawled under the aircraft to the only door on the right side. At this point, communications between the pilots and the crew in the cargo compartment was lost due to rounds severing both the paramedic's and flight mechanic's intercom cords. The pilots noted particularly heavy and accurate automatic weapons fire was hitting the aircraft at this point and looking back into the cabin saw flashes inside the aircraft

The pilots also saw several caution lights come on and felt the aircraft slide slowly forward and down the slope. The pilot used full aft cyclic and power attempting to hold the partial hover. When contact could not be made with the people in back the pilots decided to pull off as the ground fire made it apparent the aircraft was being severely damaged. The TO was down slope and as the aircraft reacted translational lift the pilots noted both generator and transformer rectifier lights were on, the fuel flow on #1 engine was 1200 lbs per hour, the fuel quantity in the forward tank read 0 and the aft tank read 800 lbs. At this point the pararescueman changed intercom cords and advised the pilots there were three survivors on board. JG 29 advised everyone he was badly damaged, leaking fuel, and he could not attempt to pick up the remaining two survivors. The co-pilot of JG 29 recycled the generators and as they came back on line the boost pump caution lights went out. JG 29 started climbing out of the area. The flight mechanic advised that the cabin was flooded with JP-4 and fumes were heavy throughout the aircraft. The pilots were also advised that the auxiliary oil system had been hit and that the oil had spilled onto the cabin floor. All crewmembers were aware of the potential fire hazard that existed and necessary precautions were taken. JG 29 continued to climb to 9000 feet over the area. Based on the 800 lbs of fuel on board, JG 29 co-pilot advised Queen that JG 29 could not reach Channel 69. JG 29 elected to go to Channel 85 as it was closer. The Flight Mechanic advised the pilot that the fuel lines on the right side of the aircraft were cut and fuel was pouring out. The flight mechanic and pararescueman wrapped the lines to cut down on the leakage. The co-pilot cautiously left the crossfeed switch open and both aft boost pumps on while turning on both forward boost pumps. The rate of fuel consumption on the aft tank decreased indicating we still had fuel in the forward tank. The co-pilot attempted to contact Khe Sanh tower for landing instructions and runway lights. When radio contact could not be established he contacted Queen on HF requesting they call Khe Sanh on the land line and advise Khe Sanh of JG 29‚s situation. Khe Sanh tower came on the air just as JG 29‚s DME read 2 miles and advised JG 29 Khe Sanh‚s runway lights were inoperative and the area was blacked out except for two floodlights the Seabees were using to repair the runway. The crew of JG 29 spotted the floodlights and started a slow spiraling right turn descending from 9000 feet. At 6000 feet the tower operator, Marine Cpl. Covey, advised JG 29 that there were two 5000 foot mountains 2 miles from the field, that he had JG 29 in sight and would visually GCA JG 29 into the field. JG 29 had noted an unsafe right main gear indication earlier, left the gear down and visually checked it was down. At 2000 feet tower advised JG 29 he was abeam of runway 28 and JG 29 lined up on the Seabee‚s floodlights. At this point, with the aircraft at approximately 70 kts, in a turn of 10 degrees, 500 feet per minute descent and 30% torque the pilot noted the rotor rpm go up to the 117 rpm red line and advised the co-pilot to pull back the engines. Before the co-pilot could reach the fuel controls #2 engine flamed out. JG turned on his landing lights and saw radio towers and observation towers level with the helicopter and tents and bunkers underneath. Tower advised JG 29 to gain altitude and was informed this was impossible. JG 29‚s pilots spotted a road to the right leading to the edge of the parking ramp. Aiming for that JG 29 used what power was available to slow its rate of descent and forward speed. The aircraft hit the ground on the road with the nosewheel just short of the ramp. The last few feet of the descent visibility was zero because of flying dust. As the aircraft touched down the pilots shut down the one remaining engine. When the pilot attempted to put on the rotor brake he discovered it was inoperative. The crew and passengers exited the aircraft until the fire truck arrived. Examination of the aircraft revealed it could not be flown out with extensive repair. Landing at Channel 85 was 1806Z.

3. The survivors were: 3 indigenous personnel, names unknown; positions on Flatfoot Team: Team Sergeant, Interpreter, and Pointman. The interpreter was wounded in the leg as he got in the helicopter; otherwise all survivors were in good condition.

4. Weather was no factor ˆ clear and 25.

5. Extremely heavy automatic weapons and rifle grenade fire was encountered.

6. Crew of Jolly Green 29:
      RCC ˆ Capt John B. McTasney
      RCCP ˆ Capt Jerry D. Clearman
      FE ˆ Sgt Alvin A. Malone
      RS ˆ SSgt John H. Stemple

Signed
JOHN B. McTASNEY, Capt, USAF
Rescue Crew Commander

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